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I would  like to welcome  each  and  every  one  of  you to Goddard  Space  Flight  Center. I think 
this is the  1  lth  year  that we  have  had  a  meeting  here  on  batteries  and  the  10th  year  officially  where 
it was  called  a  workshop. 
I  would  like to know  how  many  are  here  this  morning  for  the first  time.  Would  you  just raise 
your  hands. Well, that is  quite  a  large  percentage  of  the  group.  I  hope  you  enjoy  the  workshop. 
We try  to vary the  format  from  year  to  year,  and  this  year  for  reasons  stated  earlier, we  have  a  panel 
discussion. 
Lou Slifer  has given you  the  background  on  the  OSTA  workshop  that was held  this  summer. 
There  were  four  different  disciplines  discussed  at  this  workshop.  They  were  power  which Lou has 
covered,  electromechanical,  attitude  control,  and  radiometric  instruments. 
I t  so happened  that  the  initial  call  for  the  workshop was on  radiometers  or  radiometric  instru- 
ments,  but  because  of  ongoing  flight  spacecraft,  different  problems  with  different  missions,  it was 
decided to  expand  the  workshop  into  the  other  areas. As  with  the  design  of  the  satellite,  the  last 
thing  thought  about was the  power  system  workshops. So, we somewhat  got  into  the tail  end of it. 
Having  been  a  participant in that  workshop,  it was very  worthwhile. We found  out  that we 
are not flawless, we do  make  errors  in design  and we make  errors in judgement.  But,  the  proof  of 
how  good  a  technical  group we are is to  learn  from  these  past  mistakes,  and  that is what  the  work- 
shop was  all about. 
To further  that  discussion,  I  have  requested  people  from  private  industry  and  government 
labs to  sit in and  to assist me in establishing  a  dialogue  with  the  people in the  battery  community, 
particularly  defining  the  problem,  trying to  come  up  with  some  recommendations,  and  bridging  the 
technology  gap.  Out  of  these  four  workshops,  there  was  one  very  common  theme:  that is tech- 
nology gap. Or,  better  said,  the  lack of engineering  data base.  Where  is the  line  drawn  between 
R&D  laboratories  saying,  yes,  this is developed  technology,  and  the  project  manager  saying,  yes,  we 
are  ready  to  fly? 
What is very  real is that  there is  a  large  gap  in  that  area. We find  that,  and I am  sure  most of 
you  have  been in this  situation,  you  have  something  that  looks  good,  you  follow  it  from  develop- 
ment  for 4, 5, maybe even 10  years,  and  you  sit  down  with  a  project  manager  and  say, “We think 
this  is  what  you  need  for  your  mission.  It  has  the  peculiarities  necessary  to s lve your  problems.” 
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The  project  manager  asks  that  question,  “Where  has it flown  before?” Well, it  probably  has 
not.  But  yet  he  has  a  need,  and  you  would  like to see  him  use  the  technology. So you  both  have  a 
vested  interest.  The real problem  comes  when  the  project  manager  then  says,  “Yes, I would  like to 
fly it,   but let’s see some data  on it. Let’s  see  that  engineering  data  base  which I can  make  a  decision 
on.” 
So you  go  back  to  the  literature,  you  make  a  few  frantic  phone calls,  and  you  find  out,  yes, 
there is a  data  base;  it is rather  fragmented,  there  is  no  real,  solid  core  from  which  you  can  make  up 
your  story  and  provide  a  convincing  argument  that  this  is  where we got  to  go  and  this  is  what we 
have to  substantiate  our  claim. 
With the  emphasis  on  cost-effectiveness  programs, low risk and  long  life,  there  has  got  to  be  a 
better  solution  than  the  piecemeal  effort I think  we  have  had  in  the  past.  The  question  is,  what 
constitutes  flight  readiness? 
Certainly,  our  project  manager is very  reluctant to  take  on a development  program  and  a 
piece  of  spacecraft  hardware. I distinguish  that  between  a  flight  instrument,  because  use  of  flight 
instruments is just  that  they  are  pushing  the  state  of  the  art.  Very  few  project  managers are  willing 
to  push  the  state  of  the  art in the  spacecraft design. 
So, the  question  is,  where is this  engineering  development  going to  come  from? Who should 
do  it?  Should  private  industry,  government  labs,  or  who?  That is what  the  topic this  morning is. 
I would  like  at  this  time to  introduce  the  panel  members. I think  you  know  most  of  these 
people,  the  ones  that  have  been  here  before. 
On  my  left is Dr.  Steve  Paddack. Dr. Paddack  has  been  with  Goddard  for  a  number  of  years. 
He is like  myself,  he  does  not  talk  about  how  many  years  any  more. He  is  the  deputy  for  technical 
on  the COBE  project,  and  he is here  to  represent  the  project  viewpoint  on  the  question  that I have 
raised. 
We also have  Jim  Masson  from  Martin  Marietta.  Jim  has  been  working in NiCad for  a  number 
of  years,  and I am  sure  he  has  experienced  some  of  the  problems I have  already  mentioned. 
We have  Dr.  Badcock,  Aerospace  Corporation.  Chuck  and I have  sat  across  the  table a few 
times  with  unresolved  problems  that we wished to  resolve before  the  launch. 
We have  Fred  Betz, Naval Research  Lab.  Fred is one of the  few  who  have  been  able  to sell 
his project  on  flying  the  state  of  the  art,  since  Fred  was  one  of  the  first,  or  the  first  to  get  a  nickel- 
hydrogen  battery on a  satellite  and  still  working  successfully. 
We have Bill Naglie,  Lewis Research  Center. Bill is more  or less t o  represent  the  research  end 
of the  discussion. 
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Then, I have Gert Van Ommering, Ford-Philco, Ford-Aerospace almost at Comsat. Gert 
comes to us with  kind  of  a  mixed  background, so I think  he  can  speak  from  either  side  of  the  sub- 
ject. 
Ed  Kipp, TRW. Ed’s background  is  in  aerospace  batteries.  He  has  been  in it for  a  number  of 
years.  He  works  off  in  the  manufacturing  and  applications  end. 
With that I have  asked  each  panel  member to be  prepared to give us a 2- to 5-minute  discus- 
sion  of  his  viewpoint  on  the  issue. 
After  the  panel  members give their  viewpoints,  we will then  open  the  discussion  for  questions 
and  general  dialogue  from  the  floor. I encourage  and will seek your  participation.  Steve, I would 
like  for  you to initiate  the  discussion, if you  would. 
DISCUSSION 
PADDACK: I have the  uncomfortable  feeling  that  I  am  the  only  member  of  the  user  com- 
munity  group. I use your  batteries,  and  a  lot  of  the  things  that  Floyd was  saying  really rings true. 
We find  ourselves  in  very  awkward situations. I have  dealt  primarily  with  missions  that  are  made 
here  at  Goddard, so I am  more  familiar  with  in-house  projects  than I am  with  the  projects  that  are 
made  out. 
We find  ourselves  in  a situation in  which  we  want to fly  a  real  good  spacecraft  for  nothing. 
Like,  reduce  the  cost t o  practically  minimum.  You  would  like to develop  new  technology,  but  they 
say,  “Take  high risks. But, if you fail, you  are in  trouble.”  That is the vice. They  want  success, 
they  want  to  keep  the  manpower  costs  down  and  the  hours  cost  down,  and it is a  very  difficult  sit- 
uation. 
Everybody gives a  lot  of  lip  service t o  new  things,  where  we  often  find  ourselves  in  situations 
in  which  we  would  like to fly  things  and  try  new  things.  The  remarks  that  Ford  was  making  about 
the  engineering  development  phase,  the  data  base  and  the  information,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  situa- 
tion  often  in  which  a  new  technology,  a  new  thing,  a  new  device  we  would  like to be  used  in  a 
spacecraft,  and  the  project  officer  says,  “Has  it  flown  before?” 
And  the  answer  may  come  back, “Well, not really.  You  know,  we  have  changed  it  a  little  bit, 
we  have  got  this  new  thing  called  a  lithium  battery,  and  it  is  great.”  Or, “silver hydrogen,” or what- 
ever. 
We say, “Well, good,  we will talk  about  it  and  maybe  develop  some  kind  of  a  phase.”  Then 
we  say, “We would  like to test  it”  and  the  manufacturer  that  produces  the  battery  wants o test  it 
and  will  say,  “Here  is our  environmental  test  program.” 
3 1  
We will say, “We would  like  to  test  it  like we  fly it.” But,  we  find  for  a  variety  of  reasons  we 
cannot  do  that,  and we cannot  test  it  like  we fly it,  so we  go off with  a  pretty  substantial risk. It 
makes  us  very  nervous to fly new  technology  from.that  point  of view. 
I  don’t  know  what  the  solution  to  this  kind  of  problem is.  I  have  been  involved  with cases 
where  we  fly  new  technology,  and I guess  a case in  point is related to  solar cells. We had to have  a 
new  spacecraft,  the  whole  surface  of  which  was  conductive. Well, that is  kind  of  a  bizarre  thought 
to  start  with.  How  do  you  handle  a  totally  conductive  surface  of  a  spacecraft? 
Well, they  get  the  solar cells and  the  antennas;  the  whole  thing  starts  developing.  In  particu- 
lar,  with  the  solar  cells-and I see  Dr.  Gaddy  smiling  up  there-he  was  put  into  it  up  to  here,  and we 
did  not  know  whether  it was  going to  work.  But, we  had to  put  the  cover  on  these  solar cells to  
transmit  charge  from  one  place to  another. We were not  talking  about  much  charge, 
But,  we  were  finding  that  the  stuff  that  we  coated  the cells with  changed  its  characteristic.  It 
was not  always  the  same  resistance.  Then, we had to  tie  each  solar cell to  the  next,  and we  would 
run  into  such  simple  problems,  the  kind  that  you  would  run  into  at  home  with  your  kid  at  dinner 
time. 
You  would give Mark  his glass of  milk  and  you  say,  “Don’t spill it. You spilled i t  last  night.” 
He reaches  over  and  his  coat sleeve knocks  over his glass of milk.  You  say, “Spilled your  milk 
again.” And  you  get  angry. 
Well, this  happens  with  the  spacecraft. We have  technicians  who  wear  lab  coats,  and  we  say, 
“Look,  delicate  stuff,  don’t  touch.”  Lab  coat  drags  across  the  solar cells and  breaks  the  little  con- 
ductive  wires  that  connect. 
These are the  kinds  of  things  that  rather  get  you.  You  cannot  test  something.  You  want  it  to 
be  a success, and  when  you  are all done,  you look through  your  development  program,  you  say, 
“What do  we have?”  You  say,  “Well,  I  have  got a battery  I  think is going to  work,  and  I have  a sys- 
tem  that  looks  good.” 
Readiness  Review  Committee  says,  “Let  me see your  test  program.”  You  know  it  always 
comes  back to  that  thing.  And  you  say, “If  we had  a  few  more  dollars.”  You  don’t  get  a  few  more 
dollars.  “If  I  had  some more  time.”  You  don’t  get  more  time. 
It is really a  tough  problem.  It  reduces  to  the  thing  where  we  would  like  to,  from a conserva- 
tive point  of  view,  go  down  to  Sears  and  buy  a  Diehard.  Look, we got  a  5-year  guarantee.  It is kind 
of like the  conservative  person. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  the big panacea  comes,  shuttle. We have  got  his  wonderful  shuttle 
that is  going to solve all our  problems. Weight  is no  problem. All of  a  sudden, weight  is  a  problem. 
So, we  are  pressed  back into  weight.  They  keep  nibbling  away  at us. We feel  very  uncomfortable 
with  it. 
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Would we  like to find  new  technology? Yes. I  would  like t o  do it  here  at  Goddard. I would 
like to see  new  technology  flown  on  the  spacecraft  here  at  Goddard. I was  encouraged to see  that 
Fred  Betz  has  got  nickel  hydrogen  into  orbit. I hope  it  works. 
BETZ: I cannot  do  it  alone. 
PADDACK:  However,  that  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  we  are  into.  It is a  trap.  It is a  dilemma 
situation. 
BETZ: I t  is funny.  I  think I missed  only  one  of  these  workshops  and  that  was  the first  one, 
so I  have  been  here  a  long  time. 
This  is  not  a  new  problem.  It  was  a  problem  when  I  was  working  with  batteries  10, 1 1 ,  and  12 
years  ago,  getting  new  technology  on.  And  the  problems  have  been  the  same:  It  is  developing  the 
data base. 
We, at  NRL,  together  with  Comsat  Labs,  did  get  nickel  hydrogen  flying  without  a  data  base, 
without  a  voluminous  data base that is required  for  most  programs. We did it with  a  backup  system 
with  nickel  cadmium  to  back  up  the  nickel-hydrogen  system. So, that  made  it relatively  easy. 
Also,  I  represented  the  project  officer  at  the  same  time  I  represented  the  people  responsible 
for  the  power  system, so we  could do  pretty  much  what we wanted  to  do. We had  that  kind of 
flexibility  in our  organization. 
Comsat  Laboratories  had  developed  the  technological  element,  and  we,  together  with  Comsat, 
aggressively said,  “Hey,  we  want t o  fly  this  stuff.”  It was not a  case  of  the  project  office  saying, 
“We don’t  want  to fly it.”  Or, “We are  afraid of  it .” We went  after  it aggressively, and  that is the 
difference. 
However,  when  we  proposed  NTS-3, we said,  “Let’s leave the  nickel  cadmium  battery  off.  If 
we  are  going to fly  just  nickel  hydrogen, we are  going to  make it failure-proof. We will put bypasses 
on  the cells.” And  our  management said, “Wait a  minute.  The  last  one  worked so well,  we  are not  
going to change  it.”  NTS-3  got  cancelled. 
But  it is amazing  how  the  inertia of the  system  developed  through  one  program. “You flew 
nickel  hydrogen,  fly  it  again,  but  fly  it  the  same  way,  don’t  change  anything.”  And  money  came 
into  the  picture. W e  did  not  have  the  money  to  run  a  new  development  program  for  bypass. 
I  think  that  new  technology will come  in  where  it is mandatory.  The  Galileo  program,  per- 
haps, will force  the  lithium  system  into  spaceflight.  Where  the  needs  are  mandatory,  yes,  you will 
get  it;  where  the  needs  are  not  mandatory,  alternative  approaches  today seem to  be  the way to go. 
Now,  the  only  way  around  this  that  I  see is for  the  organizations  that  do  technology  develop- 
ment  sponsor  it.  The  organizations  that  launch  spacecraft  which  are  the  same  organization,  primarily 
the  Department  of  Defense  and  the  Air  Force-pardon  me,  the Air  Force  and  the  Department  of 
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Defense-and NASA, who  do  the  technology  development  and  end  up  primarily  responsible  for ly- 
ing  spacecraft to force  the issue in  technology  development. I will  propose  that  those  people  target 
these  new  developments  directly  into  their  future  programs  and  force  them  along. 
You  are  saying  that  there  is  a  cost  benefit  in  the  future  for  these  programs,  for  this  new  tech- 
nology.  The  cost  benefit  is  in  the  future.  The  corporate  payoff  is  in  the  future  for NASA and  for 
the  Air  Force.  But,  you  guys  don’t  want to invest  the  dollars  for  the  program  manager to bring  it 
along  into his  program.  He  says i t  costs  too  much  and  it s  a  risk. 
Take  the risk out  by  funding  the  development  from  the  technology right  through  the  flight, 
to   the flight on a given program.  Then  you  have  bridged  the  gap. 
KIPP: When  Floyd  asked  me  to  sit  on  this  panel, I somewhat  got to reminiscing,  because I 
can  go  back to  about 27 years  into  the  mid  to  late 1950s when  we  started  in  the  early  ballistic mis- 
siles programs  at  the  General  Electric  Company. When I started  thinking  about  this  and  thinking 
about  the  change  in  atmosphere  and  the  climate  that  has  taken  place  between  those  days  and  what 
we  are  looking  at  today  when  it  comes  to  flying  hardware. 
I am sure  that  anything  that  any  one  of us will say  here  today will be  an  oversimplification of 
what  the  problem  really  is.  When  each  of us in  his  own  way  and  in  his  own  shop  tries  and  finds  ways 
of convincing  program  managers t o  fly different  kinds of hardware,  it  seems  as  if  we  had  lost  some 
of  the  spirit  of  adventure. 
Back  in  those  early  days,  it  was  not  a  matter  of  having to develop so much  of  a  data base. I t  
was  finding  something to  fly.  Finding  someone  who  could  make  something  that  you  thought  might 
work. 
Well, we  did.  Earlier  our  goal  was,  “If I can  get  something t o  fly for 3 months,  that  would 
really be  neat.” We found  something  that  would fly for 3 months.  Then, we  flew 3 months,  it  lasted 
6 months,  it  lasted 3 years,  and we were  very  elated. 
Also, in  those  days,  there  was  lots of money available.  Program  managers at  that  time  were 
not so profit-oriented  as  they  are  today.  They  were  success-oriented, as far as  getting  something 
that  would  fly,  and  fly  and  last  for 3 months or 6 months. 
Today,  the  climate is totally  different.  Speaking  from  the  commercial  end  of  the  world if 
you will, at  TRW,  where  we  are  in  the  business to  make  a profit and to have  successful  programs, 
the  climate  has  truly  changed.  Today, you have to   be a  darned  good  salesman to  convince a pro- 
gram  manager  that  what  you  are  proposing will work  and  that  it will work  successfully. 
We have  gone  through  this  stage  where  we  have  been  flying  nickel-cadmium  batteries  for  the 
most  part in supporting  low-Earth  orbit  and  geosynchronous  kind  of  orbit  missions,  and  we  have 
got  them  working  for 5 years, 6 years,  and  in  the  area  of 7 and 8, even  though  there  have  been  a 
lot  of  problems  come  along  when  we  get to the  6-year  and  7-year  point. 
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As Fred  said,  it  has  been  working,  you  face  a  program  manager  with a silver hydrogen,  nickel 
hydrogen,  or  something else,  and  he  says,  “Prove i t  to me fellows. You know  I  got  something  that 
works; I know  it  worked  for 7 years or 6 years.” You have  got to be  a  darned  good  salesman  in to- 
day’s climate. You have  got to start  your selling  very  early. You have got to sell. If  you  are  work- 
ing  with  a  government  agency,  try  and sell them  on  the  idea  that  it  is  a feasible idea;  if  you  develop 
the  necessary  data  base,  it will work. You carry  your selling  right  along. 
You sell in-house  people;  you sell your  own  functional  management  to  get  the  money to start 
something, to develop  the  data  base, to buy  the  hardware;  and  then  you  start  working  on  the  pro- 
gram  manager  end of  it. 
Right  from  the  beginning to the  end  it is  a matter  of  convincing  someone  that it is a  good 
idea,  that  it will work,  and  that  the  payoff is there. 
PTCKETT: Along  the  same  lines,  I  would  like to  mention  that in selling the  technology  some- 
times  you  get so enthusiastic  about  it,  sometimes  it is oversold  a  little  bit,  and  it is sometimes  hard 
to live up  to  the  expectation  once  you  get  some r al test  data  on  the  article. 
It is very  difficult t o  develop  a  data base for new  technology. Most program  managers  want 
to see  real time, live testing on the  component  or cell that  you are  trying to  introduce  into  their 
program.  This is not  always  possible. By the  time  you  get  the  real-time  test  data on the  thing.  the 
technology is almost  obsolete  to  satisfy  some  people  anyway. 
Really  what is needed-the Air Force  and  NASA  have  recognized  this  for  quite  some  time-is 
accelerated  testing, so one  doesn’t  have t o  go  through  the  arduous  process  of  going  through  the real- 
time  test  every  time  you  want to   put  a  new battery,  cell,  or  whatever  it is on the  spacecraft. 
We, at  Hughes,  are still continuing  in  this  line. We have got  some  accelerated  testing  going in 
our R&D, and we continued  to  watch  with  interest  the  research  that  goes  on  with  the  NASA  pro- 
gram. 
Accelerated  testing  has  got  a  bad  name in the Air Force  to  some  extent. When I  was  with 
Wright Patterson,  it  was  very  difficult, i f  not  impossible, to sell anybody  on an  accelerated  test 
program for nickel-cadmium  batteries.  It  was  only  with NASA’s cooperation  that  any  kind of a 
sizable  program  was  developed  and  proceeded with. 
Generally,  everybody  uses  accelerated  tests.  But  trying to  get  government  agencies to  fund 
them,  because  of all the  money  that  has  gone  into  it,  is  sometimes  difficult. 
Changing  the  subject  just  a  little  bit,  my  experience,  mainly  with  new  technology, is trying  to 
introduce  electrochemically  impregnated  plates  into  nickel-cadmium  batteries.  That’s  where I started 
out. 
If the  nickel-hydrogen  system  had  not  come  along,  we  might  still  be  struggling  with  it.  But, 
i t  was  found out that  this  type  of  electrode  was  ideal  for  the  system.  The  point I am trying  to  make 
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here  is  there  has to be  a  definite  need. We have to have  some  kind  of  driving  force to  get  the  new 
technology  into  a  system.  Just  because  it  is  an  improvement,  it will not  happen.  There  has to be 
some  type  of  driving  force  or  basic  need  to  get  it  done. 
MASSON:  I  guess I would  like  to  make  a  couple  of  the  same  points  that  Fred  did. 
When you  are  trying to make  a  transition  from  the  new  technology,  any  kind  of  new  technol- 
ogy  toward  flight  hardware,  there  are  a  couple  of  different  paths  you  can  take,  ranging  anywhere 
from  government  or  industry-funded  R&D  efforts, to direct  funding  by  the  user  program. 
Of  course,  the  path  you  take  depends  on  awful  lot  on  the  technology  that  you  are  looking  at. 
Technology  has to  be  evaluated  in  terms of the  potential  benefits,  developme‘nt  costs,  and  the  risk. 
If  the  potential  benefit  of  a given technology  becomes  essential to  meet  the basic requirements  of  a 
particular  program,  then, in a  lot of  cases,  you  can  expect  the  program  to  pick  up  the  responsibility 
and  the  cost  of  funding  that  technology  development  up  to  flight  status. 
A  good  example of that  kind  of  development  effort  was  the  development  of  the  battery in 
the  Viking  program. By international  agreement,  there  was  a  requirement  that  the  Viking  spacecraft 
had to undergo heat sterilization at 135°C before launch to prevent contaminating the Martian 
environment.  The  Viking  program  undertook  the  development  of  a  nickel-cadmium cell that was 
heat sterilizable  and was successful, I might  add.  Those cells are  still  operating  after 3% years  on 
Mars. 
The  same  kind  of  technology  development  that is funded  by  our  program  organization  might 
be  applicable, as Fred  mentioned,  to  some of  the  new  lithium  systems  in  which  the  stand  life,  or  the 
extremely  high  energy  densities  that  are  potentially  available,  might  really  become  essential  to  meet 
some  of  the  new  requirements. 
Other  kinds of technology  development,  such as improvements in nickel-cadmium  systems or  
the  development  of  metal-hydrogen  systems,  face  a  little  bit  different  problem.  In  a  lot  of  cases, 
their  application is not essential t o  a given program, so the  program will tend  to  evaluate  those in 
terms of potential  benefit versus  risk. A n d ,  in a  lot of cases,  what  they  are  doing is competing  with 
existing  “flight-proven”  hardware designs. That  becomes  another  kind of a  problem. 
I guess  the  point of all  this is that  there  are  a  couple  of  different  ways  to  get  from  a  new  tech- 
nology  system  to  flight  hardware,  and  you really  have to  look  at  the  individual  technology  to  deter- 
mine  what  the  right  path is for  that  development.  In  some cases i t  is easier  than  others,  and again it 
depends  a  lot  on  how  necessary  or  how  much  a given program  hinges  on  that  technology. 
VAN OMMERING: I would  like to  use  my  few  minutes  to  illustrate  this  whole  question  with 
an actual  example  that I am involved in at  Ford  Aerospace  that  has  to  do  with bridging  the  nickel- 
hydrogen  gap. 
They  have  taken  a  system  here  that  has  been  proven  in  the  lab  quite  a  few  years. As we  heard 
earlier,  Fred  Betz  had  the  guts to   put   i t  on NTS-2, and  it  is  working  there  really well. So, we  are 
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looking  at  a  situation  in  which  we  have  a  reasonable  data  base  that  allows us t o  eriously  consider 
doing  something  like  that  on  an  actual  working  commercial  spacecraft. 
Fortunately, Intelsat decided this was the  time  to  do it, Intelsat 5 ,  for some late problems 
and  other  improvements  that we would  like to  see,  particularly  in  the  lifetime of the  spacecraft. It 
was  decided in the  middle of the  Intelsat 5 program  that we were  going to  try to introduce  nickel 
hydrogen as a  sole  energy  storage  system  on  the  spacecraft. 
Now,  Intelsat  took  the  approach  of  making  essentially  a  near-zero  risk  situation. We are  now 
involved in a  program of developing  nickel-hydrogen  batteries  for  Intelsat 5 ,  but  at  the  same  time 
we are committed to building nickel-cadmium batteries right alongside it for the same spacecraft 
that  they  are  going to   pu t  nickel  hydrogen  on. 
That’s  rather an interesting  situation  because it takes  a bit of the  pressure  off  the  schedule 
requirements.  If  nickel  hydrogen  has  some  technical  problems  that  you  still  need  to  solve, we have 
the  option of slipping it on  the  spacecraft  and  using  nickel  cadmium. 
It  also  takes  the  pressure off entirely in the  area  of  technical  success. I f  a real snag  develops, 
you have the  backup  system  there  and  you  can  put  it  on  the  spacecraft  at  a fairly late  stage,  a  few 
weeks  before  launch. 
So this is really an ideal  way to  bridge that  gap. Al l  that  it  takes is a  lot  of  money  and  a  lot 
of  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  eventual  spacecraft  user. I think, in the case of  synchronous  space- 
craft,  the  payoff  appears  to be large enough in terms  of  added  years of operation  and  added general 
reliability, as well as the  weight  advantage  that we have in nickel  hydrogen,  that  it is worth  the $ 5  
t o  6 million that  Intelsat  has  pumped  into  this  program  or is going to  pump  into this  program  and 
bring i t  on  line. 
When you consider  the  payoffs  once  you  get  into  Intelsat 6,  7 ,  and on stage,  I  think  a  general 
approach  to this  new  technology is to  look  at  those  benefits  very  simply in cost  terms. If we can 
lay  some  money  on  the  line  right  now in the  development  of a usable  spacecraft  stage,  there  are tre- 
mendous  payoffs in the  long  run. 
In some cases that  may  not  be  true,  and I think  that  has  got  to  be based  entirely  on  that  sort 
of  an  argument. 
BADCOCK: My comments  are  really  from  the  end  user. You have something  that  has  been 
developed,  and  you  have  to  find  someone  that  has  the  need.  Having  done  that,  you  have  a  sponsor. 
I am going to  address some of the questions that sponsors are going to  ask  and  expect  to  h Be 
answered. All of  these  are,  again,  motherhood  statements.  They  do  have  a lot of  bearing  on  how 
happy  he is going to  be  with  whatever  your  new  development  is,  and  he is willing to  pay  for  it. 
I guess the  first  thing is, you  know  he  needs  it,  that is why  it  is  there.  He  should  understand 
that  he is going to  buy  the  pain  that is  involved  in  bringing  this  new  development  on  line.  It is not  
the  same as the  last  one,  it  is  new.  There  are  going  to  be  a  lot  of  little  things  around  that  are  going 
to give you  at  least  intermittent grief. 
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So, what  does  he  expect to see? Well, we  have  talked  about  the  demonstration  base.  That is 
very  important.  But  included  in  that  you  need to be  able to demonstrate  what it is  going to play 
with  the  rest of the  system,  whatever  it is. If  you  have  a  battery  that  works well, why  you  should 
also  be  able to demonstrate  that  it  is  going to interface  with  this  system  properly. So, between  the 
system  and  the  batteries,  they  are  not  going to kill one  another,  either  immediately or several  years 
downstream. 
The  sponsors  also  should  ask  for  the  failure  mechanisms,  and  you  should  be  able to tell  them. 
You  cannot  say,  “Oh,  it  doesn’t fail.” You should  be  smarter  than  that. So, you  should  define 
these  failure  mechanisms. You know  how  it is  going to fail, but still i t  is a  better  product. 
I guess the  two final  things,  early  in  development  you  want o  start  talking  about  are  aerospace 
quality  specifications.  It is your  development,  you  built  this,  you  built  that,  and so on.  But, as you 
come  along,  you really  should  start  considering  aerospace  or  flight  quality  specifications to   be writ- 
ten  in  the  program  and  things to be  built  to  that,  and  not  let  it  come  after  the  fact.  This  adds  costs. 
All these  things  add  costs,  but  they  are  really  important if you  want  to  demonstrate  to  the  end  user 
that  he  should  buy  your  product. 
Along  the  same  line,  you  want to get  a  manufacturer  into  this.  If  you  are  the  manufacturer, 
great.  But  you  want  to  get  the  manufacturer  into  this  at  an  early  stage, so you can  demonstrate  you 
can  make  a  lot  of  them, or as many as  are  needed. 
Other  than  that, I think  those  are  the  kinds  of  things  that  you  wish to  get  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  guy  who is going to use i t  in the  end.  These  are  the  things  he  wants  to  see  to  demonstrate 
that  this  is  a  better  mousetrap,  or  whatever. 
NAGLIE: Let  me  go  way  back.  I  represent  the  technology  end.  Our  workhorse  system,  the 
nickel-cadmium  system,  has  not  yet  been  characterized  from  the  inside to the  point  at  which  you 
can design a  battery  for  a  particular  mission. 
In the  beginning,  they flew many  NiCad  cells  for 20,000 cycles at  very  shallow  depth  in  low- 
Earth  orbit.  There  comes  a  time  they  put  it  in  synchronous  orbit,  and  they  got  into  trouble. Why? 
There  is no actual  data  base  system  from  the  standpoint of how  the  electrodes  are  impregnated, 
whether  they  are  impregnated  fully  or  shallow,  or  what  kind  of  current  densities  any  particular  elec- 
trode will stand. 
The  batteries  themselves  are  not  designed  for  the  mission.  Even  in  the  workhorse  system,  the 
nickel-cadmium  system,  we do   no t  have that  data base. 
The  technology  end  of  it  has not developed  it,  and  it is not  that  hard  a  thing  to  do.  It  has 
been  rejected  back  in  the 1960s several  times,  and I am  mad  about  it,  of  course.  But,  let us go  on  to 
future  systems. 
I  still think  we  need  the  NiCad  data  base,  and  we  should  develop  it  for  any given method  of 
impregnation  in  the  electrodes  and  any given method  of  making  the  electrodes.  It  is  only  a  matter 
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of  doing  the  work  and  building  a  character  box. All right, we  are  going to fly  this  mission;  therefore, 
we  need  this  nickel  electrode,  this  cadmium  electrode,  and  this  separator. 
Probably  it  is  as  extensive  as  the  accelerated  testing  program,  but i still  is not available  and i t  
should  be  if  we  are  going to fly  NiCads. 
Now,  going  back to getting  the  program  manager to accept  new  technology,  in  the  NASA 
organization,  we  failed  several  times  with  new  technology. We failed the silver  zinc  getting  on  the 
Viking.  That  was  a  little  problem  with  economics. We d o  have  a silver zinc  cell. Some  of  them  are 
still  alive now  after 1 1 years  being  sealed  and  sterilized.  It  is  a  new  separator  development  that  we 
worked  out  at Lewis. 
The  thing  that  has  to  happen  for  new  technology to get  on  a  mission is at  the  time,  even 
before  the  mission is approved,  when  it  is  conceived  with  mission  analysis  people,  the  technology 
people  have to be  informed  of  it  and  develop  a parallel  technology  program so that  they  have  the 
data  base.  When  it  is  approved,  now  they  have  the  data,  and  they  can  convince  the  program  manager 
that  this is the  electrical  storage  system  that  should  go  on  a  spacecraft.  It  takes  a  lot  of  data  to  con- 
vince the  program  manager.  Not  just  the  NASA  program  manager  but  the  industry  program  manager 
has t o  be  convinced. 
KILLIAN: As technologists, we work  on  new  technology  for  a  long  time to  try  to  get  it  into 
spacecraft. As has  been  pointed  out,  the  program  managers  are  reluctant  to  receive  it. So, we  think, 
my  God,  something is wrong  and  we  should  be  doing  something  else.  I  would  like to inject  the 
thought  that  perhaps  nothing is wrong  at all and  that  we  are  perhaps  more  enthusiastic  than  we 
should  be.  It is just  nature  taking  its  course.  It is difficult  to  get  these  things  into  the  spacecraft. 
I  would  like to  quote a  famous  saying  by  Lou  Gomberg  at  RCA. He had  an  Air  Force DMSP 
program. He says,  “Better is the  enemy of good.”  Whether  he is correct  or  not is based on a  lot  of 
experience. So, I would  just  like  to  inject  that  thought.  Perhaps I don’t  think it is wrong  at all. 
GROSS: I would  like to say  amen to  the  remarks of Bill Naglie, and  perhaps  restate  some  of 
the  things  he said and  build  on  what  he said a  little  bit. 
Certainly,  making  the  transition  from  old  technology to new  technology  has  its  own  set  of 
problems.  But,  in  general,  they  are  usually  able to get  this  work  properly  funded.  Possibly  not  at 
the  rate  we  would  like,  but  we  are  usually  able to  get  new  technology  aboard.  The  problem is to 
avoid  making  the  same  mistakes  in  new  technology  that  have  been  make  in  the  past. 
The  nickel-cadmium  system,  for  example,  has  been  in  space for 20 years,  and  we  know  very 
little  about  it. We do  not  at  this  time  have  any  formal  methods  to  characterize  electrodes  for  this 
system;  we  cannot  tell  good  from  bad;  and  we  cannot  find  any  way to determine if electrodes  made 
from  one  batch  are  the  same  as  another  batch.  But  we have many  problems  with  this  system  con- 
tinually  failing  prematurely.  And,  year  after  year,  the  government  research  decisions  take  the  view 
that  the  nickel-cadmium  technology  is  a  developed  technology, it is established,  and  there is no  
need to spend  more  money  in  this  area. So, very  little  research  gets  done. 
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The  Air  Force,  for  example,  sponsored Dave  Pickett’s  work.  But,  right at  the  point  when  he 
got to start  learning  a  lot  about it, they  cut  off  the  basic  research. 
NASA Lewis  people  have  always  said  that  more  basic  work  is  required  in  the  nickelcadmium 
area,  but  they  have  never  been  able to sell it t o  get it sponsored.  It  has not been  recognized  as  an 
important  area. 
I am pleased to  see  Lou Slifer’s summary  today,  pointing  out  the  great  need to get  more basic 
understanding  of  this old system.  With  regard to  the  data  base,  the  data  that is  needed  is not  simply 
cycle  life  data,  but  it is also  basic  understanding  of  the  old  system. 
OTZINGER: With  regard to  the  data  base,  a  lot  of  companies  have,  I  think,  their  own  data 
bases that  they  consider  to be  somewhat  proprietary.  I  think  there is a  data  base.  Unfortunately, 
it  is not  generally  available. 
One  thing  that  maybe  would  pay  off  in  a  workshop  much  like  this  one is that we could 
identify  some of the  kind  of  characteristics we are  looking  for  in  R&D.  You  could  have  people 
present  papers  pretty  much  one  area,  and  the  data  base  becomes  generally  available. 
I  think,  my  comment  there  again,  there is data  around  but  it  is not  accumulated  by  any 
particular  source.  What is needed is someplace  where  everybody  can  go to say, “This is our  data 
base,  an agreed-upon  data  base.” 
No one  wants  to believe anyone else either. We do  our  forecasting  in  our  lab  and  say, “Well, i t  
means  something  over  there,  but  you  know we don’t believe everything  they  do.” 
So I think,  if we could  bring  up  data  here in a  particular  area,  say  nickel  hydrogen,  for 
example,  cycle  life,  each  year we would  have  four  or five companies all testing.  Like  the  Air  Force, 
they  have  Applied  Physics  Lab  (APL)  WPAFB,  and  made cells  available to  a  lot  of different  com- 
panies to  test.  Now, if each  one  of  those  companies  were to  test  somewhat  the  same  area  and  then 
present  the  data, we could  sift  through  it  and  say,  “Okay,  this i what we  agreed is the  acceptable 
data  base.” 
Another  comment is that with regard to flying things and saying, “Well, we have flight 
history.”  I  think  we  have an opportunity in the  near  future  of  putting  experiments  on  the  shuttle 
and  actually  conducting  tests,  going  up  there  and  having  a  dedicated  test  that  would  demonstrate 
the  feasibility,  demonstrate  that  you  have a workable  system. 
I suggest  this now  to  the  NASA  and  to  the Air  Force, to people  that  present  the  money for 
this  kind  of R&D work. 
Now, as I  say,  that is a  suggestion  and  that  would  be  one  way  that  you  could  get  on  lithium. 
You  would  get  some of the  more  controversial  systems  up  there,  you  could  get  some  data,  and 
everybody  could see where  you are. 
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KIPP: I think  Burt  has  got  a  good  comment  when  he  talks  about  the  fact  that we all do  our 
own  thing. 
I have  been  coming t o  these  workshops  for  a  long  time,  and I propose  we  have  another gap: 
the gap I see  is the gap  between  people  and all the  different  government  areas  and  industry  doing 
their own thing,  but  having  a  reluctance  to  sharing  that  information  with  everyone else. 
I  think  we  need  more  different  kinds  of  meetings  where we can  share  that  information  and 
find out  how we get  people to  break  down  the  reluctance  to  share  that  information  with  everyone 
else. We all do  have  a  common  purpose,  but we seem to  have  a  reluctance  to  share  that  information. 
BARNARD: When you  take  these  high risks, who  carries  the  can?  Where  does  the  warranty 
come  in? Is it  the  responsibility  of  the  company if something  goes  wrong  with  it,  or  does  the  user 
Pay '? 
BETZ:  The  user  pays. 
FORD: I think  the  answer  to  that  could  be  twofold.  But,  yes,  ultimately,  the  user  does  pay 
and  the  user,  meaning  a  satellite  program  that  has  invested  its  resources  and is  willing to  take  a 
certain  amount  of risk. Then,  once  the  satellite is  up there,  you  have  found  out  the  emphasis  of 
resources  and risk was somewhat  out of perspective  apparently,  because  the risk somewhat  over- 
shadowed all the  spending  you  did  to  get  a  successful  satellite. 
I might  point  out  that I think  a  point we made  earlier  about  the  changes in environment,  that 
in  the  early  part  of  the  program we were  looking  for  something  that  worked,  and  today we are 
dealing  with,  primarily,  two classes of  satellites;  those  that  are  operational  satellites  that  are  put  up 
there  for  scientific  purpose.  The  ones  most  familiar  to  you in the  audience  are  the  weather  satellites 
that  are  put  up  there  and  they  are  operational.  They  want  low risk, they  want  cheap  satellites,  but 
they  want  a 1 0-year  mission. 
Now,  talking  about  the  other  satellites  which  are  scientific in nature,  they  are  very  much 
research  oriented  as  the  Viking  program  and  some  of  the  astronomy  programs.  And  these  program 
managers  recognize  there  are risks that  can  be  taken,  but  they usually are willing to  take  the risk in 
the  instrument  field,  not in the  spacecraft  field,  not in the design  of  components  for  the  spacecraft. 
SEITZ:  Fred  Betz,  you  mentioned  the  Galileo  program  with  forced  lifting  into  spacecraft.  I 
am  wondering  what  were  the  requirements  in  the  Galileo  program to  do  this,  and  what  sort  of 
lifting  systems do  you see? 
BETZ: I would  like to  pass  that  one  since I am  not  personally  involved  in  the  Galileo  pro- 
gram.  Dave  Pickett is probably  familiar  with  that,  and I will pass the ball to  him  and  let  him tell 
you. 
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PICKETT: I  think  the  reason is simply  that  the  state of the  art  in  batteries  just  would  not 
suffice to complete the mission. 
Now,  as  far  as  the  batteries  themselves  and  that  type  of  thing  are  concerned,  we  have  a 
gentleman  here  from  Honeywell  who  is  going to talk  about  the cells and  that  type of thing  later on 
in the  program. 
That  is  the  best  answer I can give you  in  a  nutshell.  Stan  Krause  has  been  running  the  Galileo 
program  at  Hughes. I have  not  been  involved  with  it.  When  I  took  over  as  head  of  the  section,  that 
program was split  out  with  Stan  paying  personal  atten  tion to it. So I  haven’t  had the  opportunity to 
spend  the  detail  with  it  that  I  would  like  to give you  a  more  specific  answer to your  question.  But, 
you  can  talk  to  Stan,  and  he  can fill you in on  the  details. 
LEAR:  I  would  like to  voice  a  couple of comments  that  the  panel  had  brought  up  about  the 
low risk in  the  NiCad  system,  and  also  the  low  cost  of  flying  a  NiCad  system  on  board  the  space- 
craft. 
You  have to be  a  very  good  salesman  nowadays  when  you  are  working  proposals  for  space- 
craft  applications. You go to your  program  manager  and  say, “I would  like t o  run an on-line test  for 
a  peculiar  situation  we  are  in,”  or  the  test  that is required to  substantiate  flying  a  spacecraft  in 
that  particular  orbit  that  you  are  working  on. 
Because of the  data  base  that  we  are  supposed  to  have  with  the 20 years  of  background 
testing  and all that  we  have  done  on  NiCads,  the  program  managers  are  not willing to support  our 
cases now,  and  they  say, “Well, new  technology  is  coming  along.  Nickel  hydrogen  has  got  a  zero 
data base. But  we  have  got  NiCads  that  have  got 20 years. So, we  don’t  need to run  a  test.” 
Therefore,  the  cost is out.  No  more  testing. You have  got  a  data base. So, we  have to  educate 
the  program  managers  as well as the  customers  because  he is also  trying to  cut  down  when  you  are 
substantiating  a  data  base. 
HALPERT:  When  the  technologist  attempts to sell his  product to management,  he  has to 
speak  from  a  position  of  strength.  I will have to  allude to another  gap  that we  have,  and  that  is 
between  the  scientist  and  the  technologist. 
There  are 100 papers  on  the  nickel-hydroxide  electrode,  and  yet we don’t go back  into  the 
basic  data to  understand  how  the  nickel  electrode  is  working. All we  want to d o  is keep  testing  the 
batteries,  keep  testing  the cells. 
It is  understandable  how  some  of  the  project  managers  can  look  at  that  and  say, “My God, 
another  test  program. What  are  we  going to  get  out of it  the  next  time we  buy it as  something 
new? ’’ 
So, I  think  we  need  some  interpretation  of  people  from  the  basic  sciences,  the  guy  who  is 
working  at  the  microelectrode level on up to  the  hardware  item, to extend  that  technology  or to 
extend  that  science to the  technologist so that  he  can  then  speak  from  a  position  of  strength. 
42 
NAPOLI:  Among  the  users  and  manufacturers  of  various  agency  representatives  that we have 
here,  there is a  wide  data  base  of  nickel-cadmium cells that  exist,  and  there is also  a  wide  variety of 
types  of cells that  have  flown. So, you have  a big choice  of cells in the  data base to  look  back on in 
history.  I  think  you will find  if  you  look  at  the  various  programs,  Air  Force  and  NASA  commercial 
programs,  you will find  that  some  cells  are  performing  better  than  others. 
What I haven’t  seen come  out,  except  at  a  last SAMSO  workshop, is that  there was a  general 
agreement as to  what  should  be  done to improve  the  longevity  and  reliability  of cells. I don’t  see 
coming  out  of  this,  particularly  the  Goddard  battery  workshop,  people  getting  together  and  saying 
“Look,  that  company,  that  group,  or  that  agency  did  something  right. What  did they  do  that is 
different?” 
Okay. “Why don’t  you  try  to  investigate  that,  and  if  they  are  doing  something  that  is  right, 
how  come  we  cannot  do  that?” 
I  think  the  problem  why  that  does  not  come  out is the  old  “NIH  Syndrome”  that  seems to 
prevail throughout  the  industry.  Not  only is it an  “NIH  Syndrome,”  but  there is also  a  feeling  of 
pride  and  sensitivities in some of the  programs  that  exist.  One  company  does  not  want  to  exchange 
data  with  another  company.  There  are  many users here who just  don’t  want  to  show  their  data  until 
maybe 8 or 9 years  after  the  program is past  and  gone. 
So, I  think  the  problem  you  have  to  overcome is the  “NIH  Syndrome,”  for  one  thing. If GE 
has  a  power  system, TRW has  a  power  system,  and  Hughes  has a power  system,  some  way  you will 
see some  of  those  power  systems - when  I  say  “systems,”  it is ultimately  a  system  problem - are 
working  better  than  other  spacecraft  or  other  programs.  And  yet,  someone  does  not  go  back  and 
say,  “What  are  they  doing  different?”  “How  come we don’t  do  that?” 
Again, it is the old NIH  problem. So, I  think we should all take  a  little  bit,  sort  of  an  in-depth 
look  at  what we can do  to  change  that.  Unfortunately, i t  is beyond us on  the  working level. It is 
more on the  corporate level that  you  have  these  resolutions  come  to a head. 
GASTON: I  heard  the  comment  made by  several gentlemen  this  morning  of  use  of  acceler- 
ated  testing  to build up  a  data  base  relatively  quickly. 
I am all for  that. I would  like to  caution  people.  You  have  to  be  able  to  correlate  it  with 
real-time  factors,  degradation  rates,  and so on,  because  there  have  been  some real wrong  conclusions 
drawn  based  on  accelerated  testing. We have to  understand  the  mechanisms  which  occur  and possi- 
bly  correlate  them  with  the  component  degradation  inside,  or  compare  very  carefully  with real tests, 
because  that is a  dangerous  road. 
SCHULMAN:  I  would  like to propose  a  question  to  the  panel.  You  know we hear  quite  a  bit 
about  battery  anomalies.  Unfortunately,  the  only  channel  most  of us hear  about  these is through 
the  channel  of  industrial gossip. 
43 
With all these  battery  anomalies  that  seem to exist, I would  like  the panel’s opinion  as to 
whether  they  are  caused  by  an  inherent  fault  within  the  nickel-cadmium  battery  itself, or an inher- 
ent  fault  with the system  engineer  who  has  applied  his  experience to the  utilization  of  this  battery. 
FORD: That is  a  big  task.  Which of the panel  members  would  like to field that? 
BETZ: I will take  that.  Irwin,  you  have really got a  good  question  there.  But  let  me  say  this: 
Somebody  mentioned  very  early  in  the  sesion,  I  think  it  was  Sid  Gross,  who said that  years  ago  we 
flew  batteries  and  they  got 20,000 cycles  on  them.  And  a  lot  of  batteries  got  20,000  cycles.  They 
only  expected 6 months  and  they  got 18 years,  this  kind  of  thing. 
What is different  between  then  and  now?  The  batteries  have  improved;  the  power  systems 
have  improved.  The  difference  is  that  management  thinks  we  can  use  the  batteries  more  and  more. 
They  are  forcing  the  engineers to 80-percent to  90-percent  depth  of  discharge.  They  are  forcing 
more  cycles  at  higher  depths  of  discharge,  and  the  battery  engineer  really  has  his  back to the wall. 
That is the  way  I  feel.  The  battery  fails  because  you  push  it oo far. You have to understand 
the  limitations  of  the  battery  because  you  cannot  change  the  battery. You have to understand  its 
limitations  and to work  within  its  limitations.  If  management  pushes  too  far,  it is going to fail. So, 
we  have  an  anomaly. 
KIPP:  One  thing  about  Irwin  Schulman is that  he  knows  how to ask the right  questions. 
There  are  many  paths  for  the  answer  to  that  question.  If  you  are  looking  at  the  military  that  has  a 
requirement  for  a  spacecraft,  one  of  their  requirements  is  that  your  exposure  to  it,  your  availability 
to look at  that  spacecraft  and to look  at  what it is doing is extremely  limited. 
They  want  a  spacecraft  that will fly  virtually  hands  off, so you design  systems  that will d o  
that  job.  You  work  with all the  power  system  people,  and  you  come  up  with  systems  that will d o  
that  job.  Maybe 5, 6, of  even 4 years  later  you will find,  “Gee,  there  is  something  we  didn’t  look  at 
because  we  are  not all instantly  superintelligent. We designed  systems 5 ,  6, and 7 years  ago  that  we 
thought  would  do  that  job. We are  finding  today. . .,” and  here  are  specific  references to  anomalies. 
“We are  finding  we  didn’t  know all the  things  that  we  should  have  known  or  would have  liked to  
have known  about  how to use  those  systems  in  that  kind  of  mode.” 
Now,  you  look  at  the  other  side  of  the  coin  where  you have  scientific  kinds  of  satellites,  a  lot 
of  them  are  operated  by NASA where  you  can  look  at  them  constantly,  24  hours  a  day. You have 
on-line  programs to look  at  the  data;  you  have  off-line  programs to massage the  data.  In  many cases 
you will not have the  same  problems  with  the  spacecraft  you  can  look  at  24  hours  a  day,  that  you 
have  with  those  you  cannot  look  at. 
So, we  have more  than  one  kind  of  problem  here  that  we  have  to  address. 
FORD: Yes. In  response to your  question, Irv,  I  might  point  out  that  at  the  workshop  there 
was a  broad  cross  section of reasons  for  the  problem.  There  was  no  one area that we pointed  out 
that  we  don’t  understand  the  technology  as  a  specific  cause.  When  you  look  at  it,  there  are  many 
reasons  that  we  have  problems  in  orbit. 
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One  of  the  things  that was mentioned  early,  and I believe  Chuck  mentioned  this, I believe it 
should be looked  at.  This  is  in  light  of  the  data  base  that  we  have. We are  comparing  what  we  are 
doing  today,  what  we have done  in  the  last 3,4, and 5 years, with what  we  did 10 or 15 years  ago. 
Sure,  there  is  a  whole  wealth  of  information or data  based  in  the NiCad  field.  But,  the  ques- 
tion  you  always  have to ask  yourself  is,  “How  relevant  is  that o what I am  doing  now?” 
And  that is  where  the real clincher  comes,  because  you  find  out  that,  by  and  large,  there  have 
been  changes  in  the  manufacturing  process;  maybe  a  manufacturer  has  totally  relocated  his  plant; 
and  we  have  people  who  get  involved  which  also  affect  the  builder’s  ability to produce  the  product. 
Getting to the  economy,  Chuck, I believe i t  was  you  who said something to the  effect  that 
perhaps  early  in  the  program,  “to  establish  the  confidence,  you  need to start  even  a  development 
program or research  program” - more  specifically  research - to  start  doing  those in the  area  of 
quality,  make  sure  you  have  got  someone to manufacture  the  technology  you  are  looking  at. 
Don’t  wait  until  the  project  manager  says, all right  we  are  ready to  buy,  and  then  say, “My God, 
who have  we got  to  make  this  thing  now.” 
I think  there  is  an  area  there  we  have  really  got to be  sensitive to. In other  words,  you  can  do 
a  lot  in  the R&D labs,  but  bring  along  the  capability of a  manufacturer to transfer  or  to  infuse in 
that  manufacturer  the  technology  and  development you  need  later. 
BADCOCK: May I comment?  First I would  like to  answer In’s question.  Yes.  One  of  the 
things  we  have  talked  about  here  that  needs t o  be  pointed  out,  there  needs  to  be  a  trade-off 
between  fundamental  understanding  and  testing. I bite  my  tongue  here  because I like  the  funda- 
mental  understanding.  But,  you  can  only  trade  that so far.  People  talk  about,  you  know, if  we 
understood  everything,  we  would  not  have to  test. I don’t  think  that is true.  Nobody is going to  buy 
that. 
So you have a region in the  middle  here  with  testing  on  one  side  and  fundamental  under- 
standing  and  research on  the  other. You have  a  region  in the  middle  where  you  can  move  these  back 
and  forth. So, I think,  with  NiCads,  we  are  pretty  much  to  the  testing  side  at  this  point  because  we 
keep  changing  these  things. 
BLAGDON:  The  Galileo  program is using  a modular  concept in its  battery design  power 
environments.  That  has  already  offered  some  system  flexibility  to  the  systems  people,  design 
flexibility  that  would  not  have  been  there  had  we  selected  or  chosen  a  singular  battery  package  for 
the  thing. 
I like  the  comments  of  the  panel  relative  to  the  modular  concept to power  systems  design. 
With respect to establishing  a  common  data  base  industrywide, I think  it  has  some  definite  advan- 
tages  and  has  some  system  flexibility. 
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One  other  comment I would  like to  make is that  the  current  Galileo  program  has  been 
stretched  out.  That  stretch-out gives us  the  opportunity to establish  some  real-time  data  that  we  did 
not  have  in  the  original  program  which, we believe,  is going to lower  the risk on  the overall program. 
So my  comment  basically is that  time  and  sponsorship  are  also  very,  very  critical in estab- 
lishing  this  data  base  that  we  are  looking  for.  You  can  accelerate  test  programs,  but  absolute  confi- 
dence  from  an  end  user  who  does  not necessarily fundamentally  understand  the  system is only 
going to  come  with  some  real-time  data. 
But I would  like to  comment  relative  to  the  modular design concept, relative to  establishing  a 
common  data base. 
FORD: I would  like  to  summarize. I think we have  heard a large  variety of inputs, all of 
which  have to  be  taken  collectively.  And  it  may well be  that  we, in the  technical  field,  have  the 
same  problem  that  you  find in management  by  the  mall  distribution  principle.  That is, basically, 
you  only  have 20 percent  of  the  information  you  need  to  make 80 percent  of  the  decisions  you 
have to  make. 
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